In this paper, a method for image encryption is proposed based on a novel approach using chaos and transcendental numbers for generating the substitution box and the ciphering keys. The Chaotic Pi Ciphering (CPC) is a robust symmetric cryptosystem of the substitution-permutation-network type, that ciphers images in ten rounds. The objective of CPC is to avoid some general weakness points in cryptosystems, such as the vulnerability to certain types of attacks or the encryption with data loss. The number of rounds can be increased up to 14, with an even further increment of the ciphering security. An 8×8 substitution box is constructed using chaos, and its value of the Differential Power Analysis is lower than the corresponding to the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). It makes CPC more resistant to differential and linear attacks than AES. CPC has approximately 2 512 keys, presenting a high resistance to brute-force attacks. Chaos is produced by a nonlinear differential equation, and the Walsh function is applied to measure the nonlinearity of the box. The transcendental number pi and a positive integer are employed to generate the schedule keys, and the key length is equal to the image size. The randomness of the encrypted images is evaluated with four tests: entropy, correlation, Discrete Fourier Transform, and a goodness-of-fit test using the chi square distribution χ 2 . CPC was tested using well-known images from the related literature, and its performance was compared to the corresponding to AES. The results show a good entropy and a high randomness, indicating a high-quality ciphering.
I. INTRODUCTION
Image security is an important issue since frequently images contain sensitive information that should not be made public. Also, there are areas where images must be compressed without loosing information, e.g., the army, banks, astronomy, cinema, etc. In this paper, a novel image encryption method is presented, the Chaotic Pi Ciphering (CPC), where the cipher-decipher process is carried out without any loss of information. CPC is a symmetric cryptosystem with schedule keys whose size is equal to the image size.
Five aspects were considered for the design of the proposed encryption method. The first one is security. This research took into account the following attacks: differential, brute
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Ludovico Minati . force, and the ciphering and deciphering sensitivities. The linear attack is also included, although there are recent developments that do not consider it [1] , [2] . The second point corresponds to the generation of the substitution boxes (S-boxes) in a dynamic way, in order to avoid algebraic attacks [3] . Although S-boxes are not the only option, they are good tools for introducing nonlinearity to the encryption process [1] . However, there are important developments on image encryption that use no such boxes [4] - [8] . CPC uses an S-box dynamically generated by an algorithm that defines a one-to-one function [9] , [10] . The third aspect is the application of the randomness measurements included in NIST 800- 22 . In spite of their importance, they are not applied in diverse developments [11] - [14] . This research uses the Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT), which is included in the aforementioned standard [15] .
The fourth point is related to the size of the key set. CPC is a symmetric cryptosystem of substitution-permutationnetwork such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The number of keys has to be higher than 2 128 since AES has at least 2 128 keys [16] , [17] . In fact, diverse recent developments fulfill this feature [1] , [2] , [13] , [14] . The proposed cryptosystem considerably increases its resistance to brute force attacks by implementing near to 2 512 keys.
The fifth aspect is related to the data loss during encryption. The design of several image ciphering systems includes compression with data loss during the encryption process, to reduce the required memory [18] , [19] . In this proposal, information encryption without loss is carried out, since there are countries (e.g., Mexico) whose regulations do not permit data loss during the encryption of sensitive-information images [20] .
Diverse image encryption techniques have been developed. However, some of them do not specify the size of the key set, while others suffer information losses during the encryption process [21] - [24] . CPC uses a S-box constructed by an algorithm that defines a bijective function and a nonlinear differential equation, and chaos is produced by a particular parameter in the solution of that nonlinear equation [25] . The Walsh function is applied to measure the nonlinearity degree of the S-box [26] , and the transcendental number π is employed to generate the schedule keys.
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, the mathematical cryptography tools used in this research are presented; in Section 3, the algorithm for S-box generation is developed, while in Section 4 the encryption procedure is detailed. In Section 5, the CPC algorithm is analyzed, and the experimental results are presented in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 summarizes the conclusions and future work.
II. BUILDING ELEMENTS
The proposed ciphering/deciphering method is based on different mathematical tools. These tools are described in the following subsections.
A. CHAOS
In CPC, chaos is used to produce unpredictable values applied to the development of the S-box. Different methods are employed to generate chaos; in this case, the logistic map equation in Eq. (1) is implemented for that purpose:
The parameter r is the seed for initializing the chaosgeneration process. However, not every r value produces chaos. In this research, r = 3.88171828182845 . . . 27618 is used with a precision of 313 decimal digits, as indicated in [27] . The range of the real variable is 0 < x < 1.
Eq. (1) satisfies three aspects of chaos, namely: 1) x n is deterministic.
2) Small changes in r or x 0 cause unpredictable changes in x n . 3) x n cannot be predicted without all the calculation.
B. TRANSCENDENTAL NUMBERS
The entropy is measured for each schedule key used in this work. So, the sequences to the right of the decimal point must fulfill the requirement of randomness, as it is important in the mixing of information. The digits to the right of the decimal point of a transcendental number have the property that they do not follow any pattern. For this reason, these numbers are applied in CPC for the generation of both the S-box and the keys, to reach a high level of randomness. Additionally, any transcendental number is not a root of Eq. (2), with a i ∈ Z [10] . In this research, pi is used as a transcendental number. a 0 + a 1 x + a 2 x 2 + · · · + a n x n = 0 (2)
C. NONLINEARITY
Several symmetric cryptosystems considered as encryption standards, such as the Data Encryption Standard (DES) [28] , Triple DES [29] , and AES [30] use substitution boxes. Those boxes have different values of nonlinearity [31] . The nonlinearity is an important factor regarding the vulnerability of a cryptosystem to linear and differential attacks [32] , [33] .
In this work, the nonlinearity is measured according to the Walsh function, expressed in Eq. (3),
The input box of CPC is an 8-bit string x 1 x 2 . . . 
Eq. (6) measures the bias, that is an indicative of the nonlinearity. If the total number of zeros that b· F ⊕a· X takes is equal to the total number of ones, then ρ b,a (b· F, a· X ) = 0 and there is no bias. However, if there is a large difference between these numbers, then ρ b,a is not zero. The Walsh function defined in Eq. (3) is applied to consider more possibilities of bias [34] . So, for a given vector b, the partial nonlinearity that includes all the posibilities of a and X is defined by Eq. (7) , and the nonlinearity of the box is expressed by Eq. (8),
III. ENCRYPTION TOOLS
The proposed ciphering/deciphering method uses different tools for each of its stages. These tools are described in the following subsections.
A. ALGORITHM FOR GENERATING PERMUTATIONS
Given a natural integer m ≥ 2, the sets π m = {π | π is a permutation from the array 0, 1, . . . m − 1} and N m = {n ∈ N | 0 ≤ n ≤ m! − 1} can be defined. Then, taking as an arithmetic base the values (m − 1)!, . . . 1!, 0!, any n ∈ N m can be written in a unique way using the Euclid theorem [35] . It corresponds to Eq. (9), where each C i is a constant:
The numbers (m − 1)!, (m − 2)!, . . . 1!, 0! are fixed for a given m. It will be seen in the following description that C m−1 = 0, and the inequality in expression (10) is proved:
Once C 0 , C 1 , . . . , and C m−2 are calculated, Algorithm 1 is executed as follows: Step 0: An array in increasing order is defined as
Step 1: According to Eq. (10), C 0 < m; it follows that X [C 0 ] is an array element in Step 0. X [C 0 ] is removed from the array and also X [m − 1]; that is, the last element and two operations are performed: elimination and substitution. This means that the other array elements remain unchanged, and only the new position of X [m − 1] is assigned. If the value of C 0 corresponds to the last element position, then X [m − 1] is removed and replaced by X [m − 2].
Step 2: In the previous step, C 1 < (m − 1) using Eq. (10). Thus, X [C 1 ] is an element of the array in Step 1. X [C 1 ] is removed from the array and replaced with the last element. if X [C 1 ] is the last element, proceed as in the previous step.
Step m −1: If this process is repeated, the final result will be X [C m−2 ] = k and X [C m−1 ] = k, with 0 ≤ k ≤ (m − 1). X [C m−1 ] appears automatically as the last element; that is,
is a permutation of the array 0, 1, . . . , m − 1. This procedure is performed in m − 1 steps. The complexity of the permutation-generator algorithm is O(m) because a removal and substitution of an element is carried out in each step while the others stay unchanged. It was proved that the algorithm defines a bijective function N m :→ m , which is denoted as I m .
Theorem: Let N m = {n ∈ N | 0 ≤ n | m! − 1} and m = {π | π is a permutation from the array 0, 1, . . . m − 1}. Then, Algorithm 1 defines a bijective function
Proof: First, it is shown that I m is a one-to-one function, by using the reductio ad absurdum method [36] . In this sense, suppose that n 1 = n 2 ∈ N m ⇒ I m (n 1 ) = I m (n 2 ). However, according to Eq. (9), the positive integers n 1 and n 2 can be written as in Eqs. (11) and (12), respectively:
The elements of both permutations were selected in the same way, corresponding to I m (n 1 ) = I m (n 2 ); therefore,
If this is true then n 1 = n 2 , but this contradicts the hypothesis. Thus, it is concluded that n 1 = n 2 ∈ N m ⇒ I m (n 1 ) = I m (n 2 ), proving that I m is a one-to-one function. The proof that the function is surjective is simple since the number of elements in N m and m is the same. For example, if m = 8 then N 8 = {n ∈ N | 0 ≤ n ≤ 8! − 1}, and 8 = {π | π is a permutation from the array 0, 1, . . . 7}. If n = 21699, then this number is represented as in expression (13) , generating the values of expression (14) . 21699 = 4(7!) + 2(6!) + 0(5!) + 4(4!)
It is not necessary to know the value of n in order to obtain the permutation. However, it is required to know the constant set C i . Table 1 indicates the generation process. So, the permutation for n in an 8-element array is 4 2 0 7 5 1 6 3.
B. GENERATION OF S-BOXES
The S-boxes are generated using x 0 , and they are not part of the key. In AES, the S-boxes are produced in an algebraic way while the ones in CPC are created in a dynamic way, excluding CPC from algebraic attacks. From Eq. (1), numbers can be generated in a chaotic way using particular values of r, e.g., r = 3.88171. . . 27618 (313 digits after the decimal point), with an infinite number of possible values for r [37] . The procedure for generating a S-boxes is as follows:
1) An initial value x 0 is taken at random from the range 0 > x 0 < 1 with 499 decimal digits. 2) Eq. (1) is iterated until n =10000. The result is a number lower than one, and the digits after the decimal point do (15), where b i is the value associated with a byte block after the decimal point for i = 0, 1, . . . , 254.
4) After the constants C i are calculated, Algorithm 1 is applied to obtain a box as a permutation over a 256 element array, with C 255 = 0. 5) Once the boxes are calculated, the nonlinearity is obtained from Eq. (8). The images considered for testing CPC were encrypted using a S-box with a nonlinearity of 98. For any n > 0, x n has 1,000 hexadecimal digits after the decimal point. The values of x 0 and r for Eq. (1) are as follows, with n = 498: As previously stated, to know n is not required, and the factorials (m − 1)!, (m − 2)!, . . . are only marks. Thus, pi is employed to calculate C i for i = 1, 2, . . . m − 1 in a pseudorandom way, and the key is a bit sequence denoted as K . The steps for calculating the initial permutation using K are the following:
• K is a 512-bit string associated with a positive integer denoted as l. Then, the product l × pi is calculated and after the decimal point, a number of 24-bit blocks are taken depending on the image size. In this work, the size of the test images is 512 × 512. A block size of 24 bits is chosen because the RGB color-intensity resolution of many regular images is 24 bits [38] .
• The integer associated to the j-th 24-bit chain is a j , and C j is calculated as C j = a j mod (h − j), where h is the image size in pixels, and j = 0, 1 . . . h − 2 with C h−1 = 0.
• Once C 0 , C 1 . . . C h−2 are calculated, π h is computed according to Algorithm 1. The K value applied to generate the 11th schedule key is:
98FD2183B8. The schedule keys are generated as follows: the multiplication l × pi is carried out; then, after the decimal point a bit block of the image size, D 0 , is taken. This block is the first schedule key, K 1 . A one-bit circular shift to the right is performed for the second key. In general, to obtain key K i with 2 ≤ i ≤ 11, a circular shift to the right of D 0 is carried out with i − 1 positions.
The cipher process begins with an XOR between K 1 and a plain-text string, producing is the string R. Subsequently, the substitution process using the S-box in Table 2 is carried out and the output string is S. π h and S are used to produce R 1 , ending the first round. The second round includes two steps: an XOR between the result from the first round and k 2 , and the substitution. This is repeated until the ninth round. The tenth round includes four steps. First, an XOR operation between K 10 and the ninth round produces R. Then, the permutation π −1 h in the R chain is applied, and the substitution is carried out. Finally, an XOR over K 11 produces the encrypted image. Fig. 1 includes a block diagram of the ciphering elements, and Fig. 2 shows the complete process. The deciphering process is presented in Fig. 3 , with Table 3 showing a list of properties of the proposed S-box calculated according to [39] . Finally, Table 4 contains the inverse S-box.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE CPC ALGORITHM
The following measurements were considered for the analysis.
A. ENTROPY
Entropy is a common measure of information uncertainty. For this development, the entropy of Shannon [34] , [40] expressed in Eq. (16) is applied:
When working with color images each basic color (red, green, or blue) is described by one byte, corresponding to 256 levels. If these colors have a uniform distribution, i.e., all points are equidistant, the entropy is H (x) = 8 [34] . In practice, values close to 8 are desired in the basic color distributions of a ciphered figure [41] . 
B. RANDOMNESS OF COLOR DISTRIBUTION
This tool aims to determine whether the distributions of the basic colors fit on a uniform distribution, by applying a statistical hypothesis test. In this test, two elements are required, namely, a test statistic and a rejection region. Eq. (17) is used for each primary color, where o i and exp i are the observed and expected values, respectively.
It is possible to quantify the randomness in the distribution of the different colors by means of the χ 2 statistic. This type of test is not included in the NIST 800-22 test set for determining the randomness degree of the chain bits. That is, the randomness of the tone distributions of the basic colors in the encrypted image is not measured [42] . In this work, a goodness-of-fit test using the χ 2 statistic is employed, with a chi-squared probability distribution with n − 1 degrees of freedom. The general procedure of this test is as follows:
1) The shades of each color from an image are presented in a histogram, whose the abscissa has 256 divisions. Then, the number of degrees of freedom is 255. 2) If the random variable χ 2 approaches to a normal distribution according to the central limit theorem [43] , it follows that the mean and variance of the χ 2 statistic for each color are µ = 255, and σ = [2 × (255)] 0.5 = 22.5831, respectively [44] . 3) With this information, the resulting threshold for the significance level is α = 0.01. This level is on the right side of the normal distribution. 4) The threshold for α = 0.01 is 307.61, and the decision rule is as follows: if χ 2 > 307.61, the hypothesis of a random string is rejected; otherwise, it is accepted.
C. CORRELATION COEFFICIENT
A correlation coefficient analysis between adjacent pixels of the encrypted image is performed in the horizontal, vertical and diagonal directions. An encrypted figure is said to be well-encrypted if the correlation coefficient between adjacent pixels is close to zero. In this work, the correlation coefficient is referred to as the correlation. The correlation between two random variables x and y is calculated as follows: a pixel of the encrypted image is randomly chosen; its levels of red, green, and blue are denoted as x r , x g and x b , respectively, and the analysis is carried out for each basic color. Then, an adjacent pixel in the horizontal, vertical, or diagonal direction is selected, and its corresponding levels are denoted as y r , y g , and y b . Now, suppose that M pairs of pixels (x, y) are randomly selected. It is possible to calculate the correlation in three directions for the basic colors; Eq. (18) represents the horizontal-direction red-color correlation, while Eqs. (19) and (20) describe x r and y r , respectively. The expressions for the vertical and diagonal directions as well as for the green and blue colors are similar.
D. DISCRETE FOURIER TRANSFORM (DFT)
The DFT can be used to measure the randomness degree of a string with zeros and ones, since there must be no repetitive patterns one after another in the occurrence of such symbols. The DFT is applied as follows:
• The initial sequence is denoted as ε = ε 1 , ε 2 , . . . , ε n . Then, the zeros and ones are transformed into −1 and 1 respectively, applying Eq. (21),
• N 0 is the expected value (Eq. (22)), where n is the chain length.
N 0 = (0.95) n 2 (22) • N 1 is the number of values lower than the bound h, defined in Eq. (23),
• The DFT is given by Eq. (24), where i = √ −1 and j = 1, 2, . . . , ((n/2) − 1). If n is odd, only the last bit of the chain is suppressed. It has real and imaginary parts, and its module |f j | is calculated and compared to h. If |f j | < h then N 1 = N 1 + 1. Otherwise, N 1 remains at its previous value.
x j e (2π(i)(k−1)j)/n (24) • Then, Eq. (25) is calculated to obtain P with Eq. (26),
The decision rule is as follows: if P is lower than 0.01, the hypothesis that the chain is random is rejected; otherwise, it is accepted. Note that the DFT test is included in the NIST 800-22 standard. There is a relation between the erfc(x) function and the normal standard distribution. The normal standard cumulative distribution is shown in Eq. (27) ,
The complementary error function is presented in Eq. (28),
A change of variable is proposed as u = (v/ √ 2) and du = (dv/ √ 2). Then, Eq. (28) can be written as Eq. (29):
First, the complexity of the developed algorithm is analyzed. The number of keys in CPC is given by a string K with 512 bits. K has an associated integer l in the range 0 ≤ l < 2 512 . The product pi × l is used in the generation of the schedule keys for two reasons: 1) the digits in the decimal part of pi appear without a pattern, in a random way; 2) the function f (l) = pi × l is a one-to-one mapping, implying that if l 1 = l 2 then f (l 1 ) = f (l 2 ). It is true if all the decimal digits in pi are considered. Since it is impossible, the collision probability has to be evaluated; that is, the probability that two finite pi chains l 1 = l 2 yield f (l 1 ) = f (l 2 ). However, the probability of this case is almost zero, based on the following reasoning: Suppose that the image size to be ciphered is 512 × 512 pixels and the integers associated with K 1 and K 2 are l 1 and l 2 , respectively. Thus, two chains can be built: D 01 = (pi) × l 1 and D 02 = (pi) × l 2 . Then, 512 × 512 × 24 = 6291456 bits are taken after the decimal point for D 01 and D 02 . These strings are K 1 1 and K 2 1 , i.e., the first schedule keys. Lets assume that the i-th bit of the string D 01 is independent of the i-th bit of D 02 since K 1 and K 2 were randomly chosen. Moreover, the a priori probability that the i-th bit of D 01 is equal to the i-th bit of D 02 is 0.5. Then, the collision probability, i.e., all the bits are equal in both strings is (0.5) n×n×24 . For n = 256 and n = 512, the collision probabilities are (0.5) 1572864 and (0.5) 6291456 , respectively, that can be considered as zero for practical cases. It can be assumed that the number of keys is 2 512 . So, the complexity of the algorithm to a brute-force attack is O(2 n ) with n = 512. This implies that a brute-force attack has to test O(2 512 ) keys, which is higher than that of AES-256 (2 256 ).
The Differential Power Analysis (DPA) was applied to the proposed S-box, producing a value of 9.2 that is lower than the corresponding value of AES (9.6). For this reason, CPC is more resistant than AES to linear and differential attacks [39] . Additionally, it is important to note that the key of the symmetric cryptosystem in a secure communication scheme (e.g. PKI [45] - [47] ) is changed when sending each message. CPC is symmetric; so, its key changes in every communication. The permutations in the first and last rounds are variable because they are key dependent, adding robustness to the proposed cryptosystem. 
VI. EXPERIMENTATION AND RESULTS
CPC was tested by ciphering/deciphering several images, but the four well-known images shown in Fig. 4 [48]- [50] were used for the reported test, due to their characteristics. There is a repository in https://imagencryptionipn.blogspot.com/, with more results. The selected images have a resolution of 512 × 512 pixels, and have been employed for comparison purposes in previous developments in this area. The Donkey image is used to test the proposed cryptosystem because if a symmetric system is used in its encryption, there is a risk that the encrypted figure will not pass the randomness tests proposed in this work. In the case of AES, the CBC mode is used to encrypt images. However, it offers a maximum security of 2 256 .
As mentioned before, the quality of the resulting encrypted test images was evaluated using the correlation, entropy, DFT, and the proposed goodness-of-fit test. The results for the correlation are presented in Table 5 for each direction and each basic color, considering M in Eq. (18) as 3000. For the case of the entropy, the results for the images in Fig. 4 are summarized in Table 6 , using K .
The following exercise was also carried out: in a random manner, 10,000 keys were chosen and applied to the Lena image in Fig. 4 . The average, smallest, and largest entropies for each basic color are listed in Table 7 , with values close to 8. In addition, the randomness of the schedule keys was measured using the entropy, and the results are presented in Table 8 . The XOR operation was performed with a random bit chain. Only the results for keys 0-7 are listed; the remaining are repeated because of the way in which the schedule key is generated. The DFT test results are in Table 9 , with α = 0.01 and , x as the accepted and rejected marks, respectively. As can be seen, the randomness hypothesis is accepted for every color in the four images encrypted with K .
The results for the goodness-of-fit test are summarized in Table 10 . A hypothesis test that employs the χ 2 distribution was proposed to measure the degree of randomness of the basic color distributions. It is observed that the null hypothesis is always accepted. This test is not included in the NIST 800-22 standard because is a very particular case. The software was developed in Java and Visual Studio R , and the encryption time to cipher a 512 × 512 image is 3 ms.
The distributions of the basic colors are shown in Fig. 5 for the original and encrypted Lena images, considering the horizontal, vertical, and diagonal directions from top to bottom. It can be observed that the encrypted images do not follow any pattern. The first, third, and fifth columns in the figure show the scatter of the points in the three directions for the three basic colors using the original image. In the same way, the other columns show the scatter of the points with the same directions and colors for the image encrypted with K .
The histograms of the basic colors are presented for the encrypted Lena image in Fig. 6 . Its sensitivity results, i.e., the correlation between two encrypted images with different and close keys, is summarized in Table 11 , using the keys K and K + 1. Fig. 7 presents the original and the encrypted images using K . The results indicate no relationship between the ciphered images. On the other side, Table 12 shows the sensitivity in the ciphering process for Lena. That is, the correlation between the image ciphered with the K + 1 key and the original image ciphered with K .
For the randomness of the encrypted images, those results as the entropy and correlation that do not depend on a hypothesis test give acceptable values for all the test images. In the case of the entropy, the results are better than those reported in other investigations [51] , [52] .
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, a novel cryptosystem of the substitutionpermutation-network type to cipher color images is presented, the Chaotic Pi Ciphering (CPC). The complexity of the algorithm to a brute force attack is O(2 n ). Since n 512, CPC is more resistant to brute-force attacks than AES, that has at most 2 256 keys. The S-box in the cipher process is generated by chaos produced by a nonlinear differential equation, and is resistant to differential and linear attacks. The Walsh function is used to measure the nonlinearity of the boxes. The transcendental number π was employed to generate the schedule keys. The entropy is used to measure the randomness of the keys, and the results are better than those from other investigations. The randomness evaluation for the encrypted test images indicates that they have a good encryption quality since they passed the four applied tests. Likewise, an exercise using 10, 000 different keys to encrypt one of the test images was carried out and the average, lowest and highest entropies were reported, giving good results that surpassed those reported in related literature for the same images. As future work, it is considered to test filters for improving images that have been damaged for diverse noise sources, both in the origin of the ciphering as in the communication process. For this, it is required to change the method for ciphering-key generation.
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